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Abstract Recently, there has been an increase and abundance of literature measuring
ﬂexicurity across countries. However, there is yet to be any agreement on the deﬁnition of
the key concepts of ﬂexicurity as well as the framework in which to base one’s research.
Due to this, the outcomes found in the existing studies are rather diverse, far from reaching
a consensus, and can be misleading. This paper addresses the issues by ﬁrst introducing a
framework, namely, the various levels and stages of ﬂexicurity, as well as introducing
some key issues that should be addressed when doing ﬂexicurity indicators research. In
addition, an empirical example is given to show how the framework derived can be used to
carry out ﬂexicurity research, and to show how by not regarding these frameworks one can
come to misleading outcomes.
Keywords Flexicurity   Flexibility   Security   Indicator research   Analytical framework  
Efforts state and effects
1 Introduction
Flexicurity approaches have been gaining more interest over the past few years. This may
be attributed to the success of the so-called Danish model, and to the European Union
(EU)’s adoption of ﬂexicurity as a strategy to increase competitiveness while maintaining
the European Social Model. Due to these developments, there has been a signiﬁcant
increase in studies that deal with ﬂexicurity indicators both theoretically as well as
empirically. Despite this abundance, the discussion concerning a common framework in
which to base one’s research is lacking. Many, if not most studies, do not base their studies
on a solid framework, but rather focus on gathering indicators of ﬂexicurity which are
based on incorrect assumptions of what the indicators are measuring (for example CEC
2006b, 2007a, b; Philips and Eamets 2007). This results in numerous numbers of studies in
which the results are spurious and conﬂicting to one another. This paper addresses these
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should be used when examining indicator of ﬂexicurity, as well as some additional points
to be taken into consideration when working with ﬂexicurity indicators. In addition, the
paper provides an empirical example, using macro-level national data from EUROSTAT
and OECD, to show how the framework derived can be used to carry out ﬂexicurity
research. Through the empirical example, we can see how one can come to misleading
outcomes if the study is not based on a proper framework, with sound theoretical
backgrounds.
Thestructureofthispaperisasfollows.Section 2examinessomeofthekeyissuesthatneed
tobetakenintoconsiderationwhenmeasuringﬂexicurity.Fromthis,anewframeworkthatcan
beusedtomeasureﬂexicurity acrosscountrieswillbeproposed.Thissection also includesthe
examination of other problem aspects one comes to face, such as the issue of weighting and
composite indicators. In the third section, based on the framework and issues addressed in the
previous section, some preliminary analysis will be done, to show how one can use the
frameworkandtheaspectsofcautiongiveninthispaper,throughtheuseofempiricaldata.The
paper ends with some conclusions and discussion points in the last section.
2 Key Issues of Measuring Flexicurity
In this section, I will examine some of the key aspects that should be taken into consid-
eration when measuring ﬂexicurity, especially using quantitative data across large numbers
of countries. Here the goal is not to provide a state of art on ﬂexicurity indicators, which
has already been done (Chung et al. 2009; Viebrock and Clasen 2009), but rather focus on
the key questions one should take into consideration when setting forth the task of
quantitatively measuring ﬂexicurity across countries.
2.1 Problems with Deﬁning and Framing Flexicurity
The ﬁrst, and foremost important aspect to be aware of when examining ﬂexicurity is the
question of which deﬁnition and framework to use, thus the process of operationalisation.
Currently, there are many deﬁnitions of ﬂexicurity, as there are many researchers engaged
in the research of ﬂexicurity, and there are no agreed-upon deﬁnition (see Viebrock and
Clasen 2009). The deﬁnition of ﬂexicurity can range from any combination of any forms of
ﬂexibility and security, to the combination of more precise elements of labour market
ﬂexibility and security policies. The most commonly used framework and deﬁnition is the
so-called ‘Flexicurity matrix’ by Wilthagen and Tros (2004:171), the four components of
ﬂexicurity identiﬁed by the CEC (2007b), and the Danish golden triangle by Madsen
(2004).
The choice of deﬁnition and framework to use is entirely up to the researcher’s dis-
cretion and interest. However, one must be aware of the consequences of the choice of
deﬁnition and frameworks. By taking up a certain deﬁnition and framework, a researcher is
consciously taking a decision to put emphasis on a certain aspect of ﬂexicurity. It is
demanding to include all aspects of ﬂexicurity components, especially when trying to
quantitatively measure ﬂexicurity across countries (Viebrock and Clasen 2009:310).
However, if we were to take the narrow deﬁnition of the Danish golden triangle as our
ﬂexicurity deﬁnition, we are presuming that there is only one path towards ﬂexicurity,
which goes against the argument put forward by CEC in its 2007 document, which puts
forward the idea of ‘‘different pathways’’(CEC 2007b). In other words, a narrowly deﬁned
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other countries in order to achieve ﬂexibility while providing security. In addition, the
framework one decides on will also impact the amount of weight given to each concepts of
ﬂexicurity. For example, when using the ﬂexicurity components approach as devised by the
CEC (2007b), the concepts of active labour market policy (ALMP) and life-long learning
(LLL) are separate components. In comparison, this is considered as one component in the
Danish ﬂexicurity model, as being part of a larger ALMP strategy. Thus, when using the
ﬂexicurity components approach, by default more emphasis is put on labour force training
aspects of ﬂexicurity.
There is not a solution to this problem, due to the fact that it is not a problematic issue in
itself. It is only when the researcher does not reﬂect on the limitation of the deﬁnition and
frameworkheorshehaschosen,andarguesthattheoutcomesfoundcanbeapplicableforall
ﬂexicurity deﬁnitions, than it becomes a problematic issue. Overall, all studies that measure
ﬂexicurity cannot but be based on certain political viewpoints due to the fact that when
choosing the deﬁnition and framework, one is choosing what is or should be ﬂexicurity.
2.2 Problems with the Framework 1: Stages of Flexicurity
After deciding on the deﬁnition of ﬂexicurity, one must then decide which stage or which
relationship between the stages of ﬂexicurity they want to measure. Flexicurity can be
understood as both a policy strategy and state of affairs (Wilthagen and Tros 2004: 169). It
is, on one hand, a policy strategy to enhance the ﬂexibility and security in order to achieve
good labour market and social outcomes. However, on the other hand, it is a state of affairs
where achieving ﬂexicurity could be the goal. Borrowing the elements of the notions of the
policy chain or policy cycle (Castonguay 2009; Spicker 2006), in this paper I apply the
distinction between efforts, states, and effects to capture the various stages at which
ﬂexicurity policies can be measured. As a ﬁrst step, this staged process is displayed in
Fig. 1.
The efforts of ﬂexicurity pertain to what is done to enhance ﬂexibility and security
within a country. The efforts can take the form of ﬁnancial, legal and other measures,
including arrangements and institutions as embedded in laws (e.g. Employment Protection
Legislation; regulation on wage and working time) and policies, and practices of various
actors at various levels such as companies (working time arrangements; holidays), as well
as individual efforts to enhance one’s own ﬂexibility or security (such as private savings).
This leads us to the issue of the levels of ﬂexicurity, which will be elaborated later on in
this paper. The second phase is the actual state of ﬂexibility and security, which concerns
how ﬂexible and how secure the subject under investigation is. In the case of security, since
Fig. 1 Efforts, states and effects of ﬂexicurity
Source: Adopted from Bekker and Chung 2009
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of security is, in itself, an effect or an outcome of ﬂexicurity policies. For example, income
security is one of the most important goals of ﬂexicurity policies. Thus, an individual or an
aggregate of individuals having income security is a measure one can use to examine
policy achievement. In the case of ﬂexibility, the goal of ﬂexicurity policies are not per se
to have a ﬂexible labour market, but ﬂexible markets are only means in which to achieve a
goal, may it be higher employment rates or higher productivity rates. Some security states
can also be means in which to achieve an indirect goal in the policy agenda. A good
example of this would be the drop of fertility. A country can try to enhance income or
combination security of its population to tackle the issue of low fertility. Drop in fertility
rate in itself is not a security state, but, is an effect of (the lack of) security. In these cases,
it is useful to distinguish between the state and effect and challenges of ﬂexicurity. Effects
are socio-economic performance results that come from individuals and companies being
in a certain level of ﬂexible and secure state. Here, effects are not the direct or sole
outcomes of the ﬂexicurity efforts, but refer to the indirect outcomes or wider impacts
mediated through policies, the national context and external factors, such as those raised by
low fertility rates or adverse economic shocks (such as the credit crunch). Challenges of
ﬂexicurity can be understood as the gap between the goals set when the ﬂexicurity policies
were initiated, and what it has achieved. These achievements can be seen through
examining ﬂexibility effects, or security states and effects as mentioned in the previous
paragraph. Challenges can also include problems that may arise indirectly due to the states
and effects of ﬂexicurity.
The reason why these analytical distinctions are necessary is because although the
various stages inﬂuence one another, they do not necessarily correspond completely to one
another. Institutions such as existing laws and policies are efforts to develop a certain
character within the labour market of the country in question. However, policies which aim
to achieve certain goals do not necessarily translate into actual practices,
1 and actors will
use different methods to overcome legislative restrictions.
2 Thus efforts do not always
bring the same states of ﬂexicurity. In addition, similar states of ﬂexibility and security will
bring about different effects and respective challenges depending on the different national
contexts. In other words, these distinctions are crucial to examine what is truly going on in
European countries with regard to ﬂexicurity, and mixing the various stages has the danger
of providing meaningless outcomes. Later on in this paper, it is empirically shown how the
different stages do not correspond to each other.
The Employment Commission of the European Commission, in its recent document,
also sets forth a similar framework of input, process, and output (EMCO 2009). Input
indicators are similar to efforts in that they are quantitative assessments of rules and
regulations, for example concerning beneﬁt coverage or provision of services. On the other
hand, process indicators are the shares of particular groups of persons affected by or
participating in policy measures. In our framework, this is considered a part of efforts,
since the population affected in most cases are driven by the national institutions. Output
indicators are similar to that of our state and effect, and the EMCO group does not make a
distinction between the two. This is problematic due to that, as mentioned previously,
1 In a study done by the TUC (Trade Union Congress), in the UK, two-thirds of workers who work longer
than 48 hours have not signed the opt-out agreement, which is against the national labour regulations (TUC
2005).
2 For example, companies in countries that have high cost of ﬁring workers, enhance ﬂexibility through the
use of temporary employment (Dolado and Jimeno 2002; Polavieja 2006).
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means to achieve certain goals. Thus it is not appropriate to group the goals and means in
the same category. In addition, for researchers it is crucial to examine how different
situations or states of ﬂexibility and security could lead to different labour market out-
comes or effects, especially given that certain ﬂexibility and security states are means to
achieve certain goals.
Also, similar to the framework depicted here is the one drawn by the ILO for the
measurement of employment security (Dasgupta 2001). In this paper, behaviour indicators,
contractual indicators and governance indicators are distinguished in measuring employ-
ment security. Behavioural indicators relate to certain behavioural characteristics in the
labour market to measure stability of employment, such as average length of employment,
labour turnover and rate of separation from employment. Contractual indicators use the
information of the types of contracts used by companies to calculate the proportion of
employment with non-stable contracts, or non-regular contracts. Governance indicators
include the legal provisions that ensure various forms of employment protection. Gover-
nance indicators are considered effort indicators in our framework, whereas behavioural
indicators are part of states. Contractual indicators are proxies that can measure company
level efforts to enhance ﬂexibility in the company. Although the distinction made by the
ILO is suitable when the sole focus is on employment or job security, it is not appropriate
when examining ﬂexicurity overall. This is due to the fact that although contractual
indicators may have an important role when examining job security, it is not as important
when examining other aspects, such as income security. In addition, in the framework
derived by the ILO, categories derived do not reﬂect the time dimension or the relationship
between the different categories. This is not the case in the Effort-States-Effects &
Challenges (ESC) model.
The relationship between the various stages of ﬂexicurity can be understood in terms of
policy processes. Efforts made for ﬂexicurity impact the state of ﬂexicurity, which will
affect the effects that are derived from the states. Flexicurity effects, along with the past
institutional characteristics of a country, bring on new efforts, thus responses and new
policy strategies, to overcome the challenges of a country or to eliminate the negative
effects of state A. State A then evolves through the new efforts taken to the new state B.
The initial efforts, in the ﬁrst circle on the left in Fig. 1, and the state of ﬂexicurity, the
second circle, can be interpreted as the state of affairs of ﬂexicurity. Flexicurity as a policy
strategy, the efforts taken in response to the state of affairs of ﬂexicurity, can be repre-
sented as the second circle from the right. When strong similarities can be observed
between the initial efforts and the additional efforts taken at a later stage, we can consider
the policies to be path dependent. In other words, welfare state institutions are self-
enforcing and past decisions impact the set of new decisions chosen (Pierson 2004).
Alternatively, a signiﬁcant difference between previous and later efforts can indicate a
development of path deviation.
Examining the previous literature on ﬂexicurity indicators, there seems to be no dis-
tinction of the ﬂexicurity stages, and no clear frameworks have been developed. In the case
of Philips and Eamets (2007), and in the Communications on ﬂexicurity (CEC 2007b), all
three stages, efforts, states, and effects, are included in the analysis without clear dis-
tinctions. In the Employment in Europe (EIE) 2007 report (CEC 2007a), efforts and states
were included simultaneously. Some of the studies do mention the institutional versus
factual ﬂexicurity to distinguish between policies and practices (for example, Muffels et al.
2008; Seifert and Tangian 2007). However, even then the studies only distinguish between
the employment protection legislation (EPL) index and other indicators and components.
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what exactly is being measured in the analysis. Are we examining the efforts made in each
country to enhance ﬂexicurity, or are we examining the ﬂexibility and security states of the
countries, or their effects? If we include both efforts and states of ﬂexicurity simultaneously
in the analysis, we are presuming that they mirror one another. However, ﬂexicurity efforts
made do not necessarily translate into ﬂexibility and security states, because there are other
(external) factors that come into play in this relationship.
2.3 Problems with the Framework 2: Levels of Flexicurity
In addition to deﬁning the stages at which ﬂexicurity can develop, one must distinguish
between the various levels at which ﬂexicurity can be examined. Flexicurity policies are
usually observed within national as well as international governance systems, but they can
also emerge at the sector and company level (Klammer and Tillman 2001; Wilthagen 1998;
Wilthagen and Tros 2004). Thus, it is important to clarify the level of ﬂexicurity one
intends to measure.
InthedocumentbytheILOmeasuringemploymentsecurity,Dasguptaputsforwardthree
relevantlevelsoneshouldtakeintoaccountwhenderivingindicatorstomeasureemployment
security. The levels are national-macro level, industry-meso level, and lastly individual-
micro level (Dasgupta 2001). Although the second level is named industry level, it is noted
that this level entails company practices at the enterprise level. Based on the regulation
implementation level distinction of Anxo and O’Reilly (2000), I add two more level to
identify ﬁve levels of ﬂexicurity implementation and measurement. Firstly, there is the
supranationallevel,whereregulationsareimplementedthroughEuropeanUnionDirectives,
suchastheWorkingTimeDirective.Secondly,thereisthenationallevel,whereﬂexicurityis
implemented via universal application of statutory legislation, such as labour laws and other
relatedsocialsecuritylawsandpolicies.Thirdly,thereisthebranchorindustrylevelatwhich
regulations are implemented through collective bargaining applied to a range of ﬁrms or
sectors. Fourthly, there is the company level, where regulations are implemented through
corporatepoliciesandbothformalandinformalbargainingbetweentheindividualemployer
and employee. The ﬁfth and ﬁnal level is the individual level, which includes the take up of
particular arrangements by an individual. The practices at the individual level materialise
when theindividual makes effortsto enhance one’s ownﬂexibilityor security,orwhen he or
she takesup,or isenforced totake upacertainﬂexibility orsecurity arrangement.As we can
seeintheframeworkinFig. 2,industryandcompanylevelsareseparatedunlikeasitisinthe
ILOframework.Thisisbecausebothindustryandcompanylevelsareimportantlevelstotake
into consideration when examining the development of ﬂexicurity efforts.
Figure 2 displays the various levels at which ﬂexicurity research can focus on, and the
indicators the measurement of ﬂexicurity can utilize. The arrows in this ﬁgure signify the
relationship between the higher levels and the lower levels. Higher level regulations can
affect the practices/regulations at the lower levels. However, the higher levels do not always
restrict the practices of the lower levels. In many cases, the lower level practices go beyond
Fig. 2 Various levels of ﬂexicurity
Source: Bekker and Chung 2009
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restrictions given. For example, companies do not always have to adhere to legal regulations
or to collective agreements concluded at the sector level. They might use ﬂexibilities
afforded by opt-out clauses or operate outside legal boundaries. On the other hand, not all
companies make use of the various ﬂexibility options made available in the regulations
when they are not deemed necessary or suitable for the company’s needs. Companies may
also provide more security than the national and sector-level regulations require. It has been
shown that in countries where public provisions of work-life balance policies are near
absent, one can observe larger employer involvement (Den Dulk 2005; Evans 2002). Also in
case of ﬂexicurity and working time ﬂexibility strategies we can see that companies act
rather autonomously from their institutional environments (Bredgaard and Tros 2008).
For this reason, it is important to specify exactly which level of ﬂexicurity one is
examining. In some countries ﬂexicurity policies are determined by national actors at the
national level, whereas in others the initiatives are largely taken by sector or company level
actors through collective bargaining agreements or corporate policies. Without taking this
into consideration, one will not be able to grasp the actual efforts made in regard to
ﬂexicurity, nor the actual availability or implementation of these policies at the shop level.
Especially the company level can be of importance, due to the fact that company level
practices are the ﬁnal availability of ﬂexicurity options for workers (Chung 2007).
Employees themselves, in most cases, cannot autonomously choose various ﬂexicurity
options and are limited to those which are used and provided within the companies. Since
one of our key interests in ﬂexicurity research is the question of what type of environment
workers and individuals are placed in with regards to ﬂexibility and security provision, we
cannot disregard the various levels of ﬂexicurity.
One point to note here is that states and effects can only be measured at the individual
and company level. Countries or sectors in themselves are not ﬂexible and/or secure. It is
only their companies and citizens that can be in a (in)ﬂexible and/or (in)secure position. A
sector, country or Europe as a whole is ﬂexible or secure when the individuals and
companies within these particular boundaries are on average ﬂexible and secure. Thus, one
can arrive at country level ﬂexibility scores, only through the aggregation of individual and
company level micro data. For example, when deﬁning high levels of ﬂexibility in terms of
high mobility rates, country ﬂexibility score can be derived through using the mobility
rates of individuals aggregated to the country level. The same holds true for effects. Using
the mobility rate ﬂexibility example, we can presume that the effect of this may be that
there is an increase in productivity, which again could only be measured at the individual
worker or company level, then aggregated to the country level. More detailed examples
will be shown in Sect. 3 with empirical data. Figure 3 shows the model where the ESC
model is combined with the various levels of ﬂexicurity.
Most existing studies typically concentrate on national levels and individual levels of
ﬂexicurity. Those studies that put emphasis on states and effects of ﬂexicurity (Muffels
et al. 2008; Pacelli et al. 2008; and somewhat Philips and Eamets 2007; Seifert and
Tangian 2007) tend to focus more on individual levels and their aggregate national
averages. Other studies (Bekker and Chung 2009; CEC 2006a, 2007a, b) focus mostly on
measuring national level efforts, to examine their impacts on labour market outcomes. This
is largely due to data limitations, as there are not many data sources readily available for
the analysis of company or sector levels that are also comparable across countries.
Obviously, not all studies of ﬂexicurity necessarily have to take all levels into account. For
example, if the key focus of a study is on the national level efforts made to enhance
ﬂexicurity and on the national institutional context, then national levels can be examined in
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purpose of the research is to take into consideration the actual ﬂexicurity efforts made at all
levels as well as the situation in which individuals and companies actually operate,
examining national level efforts in isolation is insufﬁcient.
2.4 Problems with Measuring: Simplifying the Complexity
As we can see from the frameworks described above, measuring ﬂexicurity can be a rather
complex task. In order to simplify the complexity into manageable numbers of concepts,
while not disregarding the several dimensions that need to be taken into consideration,
many researchers use composite indicators (for example, CEC 2006a, 2007a; Muffels et al.
2008; Pacelli et al. 2008; Philips and Eamets 2007; Seifert and Tangian 2007). Composite
indicators are created by combining several indicators through factor analysis or other
aggregation methods (See Seifert and Tangian 2007). Composite indicators are also helpful
because they can capture the substitutional and complementary relationships of different
types of policies, which is one of the key aspects of ﬂexicurity. However useful it may be,
there are certain aspects to be aware of when constructing composite indicators. Firstly,
there is the weighting issue. When constructing composite indicators, it is crucial that all
concepts are given the right weights within the indicator. When more weight is given to a
certain concept, thus more variables are included in the composite indicator that represent
that concept, the outcome of both factor analysis and aggregation method will be biased
towards it. For example, let’s say we are running a factor analysis to derive ﬂexicurity
components and we include four variables to represent employment security, while only
including one variable for each of the other concepts in our model, such as income and
combination security, and internal and external numerical ﬂexibility. The result will be that
we will get an employment security factor and another one or two factors that may
represent the other concepts. If we were to use the aggregation method here, the score
Fig. 3 Combining the stages and levels of security focusing on the country level
Note: The solid lines represent the effects between the levels and stages, and the dotted lines represent how
data can be aggregated to be used for cross-national research
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countries, and the countries with high scores on employment security will score high on
ﬂexicurity. This is not a problem when this weight is based on theoretical grounds.
However, when that is not the case, the outcomes will be misleading.
Secondly, when using composite indicators we should make sure that the relationship
between the variables are what we presume them to be. When constructing aggregate
indexes based on several variables, it must be based on either one of the following two
assumptions. Either that the variables are positively correlated, or that the variables
measure functional equivalent concepts. In the former case, the result from the combi-
nation score will not deviate from what we ﬁnd based on the single factors separately, due
to its high correlation. Thus it is safe to combine these variables. In the second case, policy
measures that all serve the same purpose—such as employment security—can be combined
since a high score of one policy can substitute a low score on another. Again, when such
assumptions are not in place, just the mere combination of variables will result in mean-
ingless or misleading outcomes.
3 Short Preliminary Empirical Example
In this section, using a narrow deﬁnition of ﬂexicurity as an example, I will show how one
can use the framework and the aspects of caution given in this paper through the use of
empirical data.
3.1 Flexicurity Deﬁnition and Indicators
In this paper, to provide a preliminary empirical example, I deﬁne ﬂexicurity as the combi-
nation of external numerical ﬂexibility, income security and (enhanced) employment secu-
rity,butnotnecessarilyrestrictingtoEPL,unemploymentbeneﬁt(UB)andALMPasdeﬁned
in the Danish golden triangle model (Madsen 2004). Using this deﬁnition, two stages of
ﬂexicurityarechosen,asmentionedinSect.2.2,thatis,effortsandstates.Inaddition,forthe
levels of ﬂexicurity, here I will focus on the national levels, but will also try to incorporate
other relevant levels into the analysis. Our focus thus can be noted as in Fig. 4.
EU
country
sector
company
individual
country
individual
country
aggregate
Effort State Effect/
Challenges
individual
aggregate
company company
Fig. 4 The focus of the empirical analysis in this paper
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ﬂexicurity deﬁnition will be examined.
3.1.1 External Numerical Flexibility
There are several variables that can be used as proxies to measure the efforts made to
enhance the state of external labour market ﬂexibility. Employment protection legislation
(EPL) index is the most commonly used one in the current ﬂexicurity debate. EPL refers to
the regulations that concern hiring and ﬁring of workers on both permanent and temporary
contracts (OECD 1999:50). EPL for regular workers concerns the costs entailed for
employers ﬁring workers on permanent contracts, while EPL for temporary workers refers
to the regulations concerning hiring practices. In addition, there is the collective dismissal
protection index, which accounts for the differences in the regulation for collective dis-
missals and individual dismissals. EPL index is a proxy that measures the national level—
and somewhat sector level collective bargaining—efforts in enhancing external numerical
ﬂexibility. This is due to that it is a direct measure of the policies that enable companies to
hire and ﬁre workers at a relatively easy manner, which would then enhance external
numerical ﬂexibility.
On the other hand, at the company level, temporary contracts can be used to enhance
external numerical ﬂexibility and adapt to the institutional limitations. Temporary jobs are
forms of dependant employment which do not offer workers the prospect of a long-lasting
employment relationship (OECD 2002:132). The key aspect to this deﬁnition, compared to
the open-ended permanent contracts, is the limited time length of the contract which may
derive from employers’ need to adjust to the economic cycles or from the characteristics of
the job. Although ﬁx-term contracts are the biggest share of this type of employment, it
also includes temporary agency workers, contracts for a speciﬁc task, replacement con-
tracts, seasonal work, on-call work, daily workers, trainees, persons in government job
creation schemes and so on (OECD 2002). This has to be distinguished from open ended
contracts that are cut short by employers (or employees) terminating the contract. The use
of temporary contracts is a prime example of company level efforts in enhancing external
numerical ﬂexibility.
There are several indicators that can measure the state of external numerical ﬂexibility,
including dynamic indicators such as mobility rates, but the most frequented one is the
average tenure or average job duration. National average tenure is using the individual
level information concerning the duration of jobs, and aggregating it to the national level,
as shown in Fig. 4. This is used to represent external numerical ﬂexibility due to that in
countries with companies that ﬁre workers more easily, or use shorter term contracts, the
national average tenure will be shorter. In a very strict sense, tenure can be thought as an
effect variable, thus the effect of companies using external numerical ﬂexibility, experi-
enced by workers. Here, I relax this assumption and take it as the proxy that measures the
state of external numerical ﬂexibility (Table 1).
3.1.2 Income Security
The efforts taken to enhance income security, especially for those who have lost their jobs
are several. Although the unemployment beneﬁt system (UB) is probably the main way in
addressing the issue of income security in the labour market, there are other ways as well.
Early retirement schemes or inactivity beneﬁts, are all indirect ways of securing workers’
income after losing one’s job. To measure the level of efforts for income security, one can
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secured. However, examining the institutions is not always sufﬁcient, due to that every
country has their own way of providing income security through various ways, such as tax
beneﬁts and through kind. For this reason, the inclusion of measures such as net
replacement ratio, that is the actual income replacement rate one is likely to receive after
losing one’s job taking various beneﬁt schemes and personal situations into account, and
the national expenditures on the income maintenance of workers (thus spending on Passive
Labour Market Policy: PLMP) add information on the various methods the income of
individuals can be secured.
There are several net replacement rates (NRR) that one can take into account, depending
on the duration of the unemployment and family situations. Firstly there is the initial
replacement rate, which entails the replacement rate of those who have been unemployed
for a short period of time. However, for most countries the beneﬁt levels change during the
unemployment period, decreasing after certain months, and then disappearing altogether or
transitioning into unemployment assistance systems. For this reason it is also important to
examine the long-term UB replacement rates. In addition, the beneﬁt rates for the longer-
periods also indirectly provide information on the duration of the UB systems. Here I use
the initial NRR, which is most important for the unemployed for most unemployed are
shorter termed, and the NRR over 60 months of unemployment to take the replacement
rates for the long-term unemployed into account. In this calculation, not only the UB but
Table 1 Various external numerical ﬂexibility variables for 19 European countries
Stages Efforts States
Levels National Company Individual-aggregated
Indicators EPL index Temp shares Tenure-average
Reference years 2008 2008 2008
Austria 2.41 8.97 10.32
Belgium 2.61 7.64 11.60
Czech Republic 2.32 8.04 9.85
Denmark 1.91 8.60 7.32
Finland 2.29 15.09 9.91
France 2.90 14.20 11.54
Germany 2.63 14.58 10.80
Greece 2.97 7.88 9.28
Hungary 2.11 8.07 8.21
Ireland 1.39 13.96 11.20
Italy 2.58 7.71 11.27
Netherlands 2.23 18.28 10.77
Norway 2.65 9.03 9.15
Poland 2.41 26.96 9.20
Portugal 2.84 23.25 10.66
Spain 3.11 29.39 8.92
Sweden 2.06 16.05 10.17
Switzerland 1.77 13.29 8.86
United Kingdom 1.09 5.33 8.21
Source OECD stat
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123social assistance is taken into account to see exactly how much of one’s income is
maintained, regardless of which beneﬁt contributes to it. In addition, to take other income
maintenance policies into account, I use the PLMP as a percentage of GDP. Table 2 shows
the scores for the selected indicators for 2007, which is the latest data available. One thing
to note is that these indicate the income security efforts at the national level, and not at the
sectoral, company or individual level. In case of the latter levels, we can examine indi-
vidual savings, or other company or sectoral income savings programmes devised to
provide income security for individual workers at times of unemployment, all of which no
known comparative data exists.
The state of income security can be measured through investigating the number of
persons that are above a certain level of income. When we consider this income level as the
poverty line, thus 60% of the median income, than at the country level the aggregate
percentage of those without income security can be represented as the at-risk-poverty rate.
This rate is indicated in the last column of Table 2.
3.1.3 Employment Security
The last aspect of ﬂexicurity examined here is employment security. ALMP could be
understood as the proxy that indicates the employment security effort at the national level,
since the purpose of an extensive active labour market policy is to enhance the employ-
ability of individuals which increases the employment security of workers. The most
commonly used index for measuring ALMP efforts, is the public expenditure on ALMP as
a percentage of GDP. In addition to this, we can examine the various other types of
activities that are not necessarily public labour market policies but enhance employability
of workers. These can include life-long learning (LLL) indexes which includes both pri-
vately and publicly funded education and training, and continuous vocational training
(CVT) done in enterprises. These indicators are proxies to measure the efforts to enhance
employment security through training and education, taken not only at the country level
but at other levels, by the company and individual themselves. These indexes can be found
in Table 3.
In addition, national employment rates and unemployment rates are chosen as the
national level employment security state index. Since employment security entails workers
being employed, although not necessarily with the same employer, a country with many
workers in employment secure positions will have a high employment rate, or a low
unemployment rate. To take the time dynamic into account, long-term unemployment rates
are also included.
3.2 Differences between Levels
In this section, I examine the relationship between the different levels of ﬂexicurity. Thus,
the question here is, are the indexes derived from different levels correspond to each other?
When the answer to this question is no, this means that to grasp all actual situations of
ﬂexicurity we need to examine all levels, especially when thinking of efforts. To examine
this, I take external numerical ﬂexibility as an example. The result is that cross-nationally
there is low correlation between EPL and the use of temporary contracts, which entail that
there are large disparities between national level efforts of external numerical ﬂexibility
with company level efforts. In addition, although EPL for temporary workers should
impact the extent to which temporary contracts are being used, actually this is not the case.
We rather see a strong correlation (Spearman correlation 0.5 signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level)
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represents how in countries where regulations for ﬁring workers are strict, companies use
temporary contracts as an alternative method to enhance external numerical ﬂexibility
(Chung 2005; Dolado and Jimeno 2002; Polavieja 2006).
Table 2 Income security indexes for 19 EU countries
Stages Efforts State
Level National National National Individual-aggregated
Indicator Initial NRR
a NRR 5 years
b PLMP as a % of GDP At-risk-poverty rate
c
Reference year 2007 2007 2007 2008
Austria 63 62 1.25 11
Belgium 61 63 2.00 12
Czech Republic 67 61 0.20 8
Denmark 73 77 1.50 11
Finland 69 72 1.43 12
France 74 60 1.24 13
Germany 72 63 1.63 15
Greece 48 20 0.38
d 19
Hungary 70 52 0.36 12
Ireland 57 77 0.91 14
Italy 66 7 0.71 16
The Netherlands 74 73 1.39 10
Norway 69 71 0.42 11
Poland 57 52 0.51 16
Portugal 83 60 1.09 16
Spain 70 49 1.45 16
Sweden 66 68 0.67 11
Switzerland 80 73 n.a. n.a.
United Kingdom 50 59 0.16 15
Source OECD, tax-beneﬁt models. www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives. European commission,
EUROSTAT
n.a. not available
a Un-weighted averages for earning levels of 67, 100, 150% of Average Production Wage (APW) and six
family types (no child single, no child one-earner married couple, no child two-earner married couple, two
children lone parent, two children one-earner married couple, two children two-earner married couple).
Initial phase of unemployment but following any waiting period. No social assistance ‘‘top-ups’’ are
assumed to be available in either the in-work or out-of-work situation. Any income taxes payable on
unemployment beneﬁts are determined in relation to annualised beneﬁt values (i.e. monthly values multi-
plied by 12) even if the maximum beneﬁt duration is shorter than 12 months
b Un-weightedaveragesfortwoearninglevelsof67,100%ofAPWandfourfamilytypes(nochildsingle,nochild
one-earner married couple, two children lone-parent, two children one-earner married couple) including social
assistance. Any income taxespayable on unemployment beneﬁts are determined in relation to annualisedbeneﬁt
values(i.e.monthlyvaluesmultipliedby12) evenif the maximum beneﬁtdurationisshorterthan 12 months. For
marriedcouplesthepercentofAPWrelatestoonespouseonly;thesecondspouseisassumedtobe‘‘inactive’’with
no earnings. Children are aged 4 and 6 and neither childcare beneﬁts nor childcare costs are considered
c Cutoffrange:60%ofthemedianequivalisedincomeaftersocialtransfersforpopulationbetween18and64
d 2006
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ﬂexicurity. Examining the employment security indexes, the national level efforts of
employmentsecurity,expressedhereasexpenditureonALMP,docorrespondsomewhattothe
company&individuallevelefforts,expressedhereasproportionofemployeesparticipatingin
CVT (Spearmans correlation of 0.5), although the relationship is insigniﬁcant.
Table 3 Employment security indexes for selected 19 European countries
Effort State
Levels National (Sector)/
company/
individuals
National/
individuals
Individual-aggregated
Indicator ALMP
as a %
GDP
Employees
participating
in CVT
a (%)
Persons in
any LLL
b
(%)
(national/
individuals)
Employment
rate
c
Unemployment
rate
d
Long-term
unemployment
rate
e
Reference year 2007 2005 2007 2008 2008 2008
Austria 0.51 33 13 72.1 3.8 0.9
Belgium 1.08 40 7 62.4 7.0 3.3
Czech
Republic
0.12 59 6 66.6 4.4 2.2
Denmark 1.02 35 29 78.1 3.3 0.5
Finland 0.70 39 23 71.1 6.4 1.2
France 0.69 46 8 64.9 7.8 2.9
Germany 0.51 30 8 70.7 7.3 3.8
Greece 0.14
f 14 2 61.9 7.7 3.6
Hungary 0.21 n.a. 4 56.7 7.8 3.6
Ireland 0.47 49 8 67.6 6.0 1.6
Italy 0.37 29 6 58.7 6.7 3.1
The Netherlands 0.68 34 17 77.2 2.8 1.0
Norway 0.45 29 18 78.0 2.5 0.3
Poland 0.41 21 5 59.2 7.1 2.4
Portugal 0.39 28 4 68.2 7.7 3.7
Spain 0.63 33 10 64.3 11.3 2.0
Sweden 0.91 46 32 74.3 6.2 0.8
Switzerland n.a. n.a. 27 79.5 n.a. n.a.
United
Kingdom
0.05 33 20 71.5 5.6 1.4
Source EUROSTAT
n.a. not available
a Continuous vocation training, for all industries covered, and any type of training
b LLL: percentage of adult between 25 and 64 participation in education and training in the past 4 weeks
c For population between 15 and 64
d As a percentage of the labour force
e Persons unemployed for 12 months or more as a percentage of active population
f Data from 2006
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into consideration when examining ﬂexicurity, for reasons that in some countries different
actors play a rather important role, and the national level indicators may not always tell the
whole story.
3.3 Differences between Stages
In this section, it is empirically examined why it may be dangerous to combine indexes
from different stages into one single index. This can be shown via investigating the
relationship between the efforts and the state indexes per concept. For the efforts, I use a
standardization method to construct a composite indicator which is calculated as the for-
mula below. This method allows us to examine the country indicator scores relative to the
scores of other countries included in the analysis (for more see, OECD 2005; Seifert and
Tangian 2007). Through the use of composite indicators, we are able to examine the
relationship between the sum of efforts and states.
ycom ¼
Pn
i¼1 yi
n
yi ¼
xi   mean
SD
Here ycom is the composite indicators per concept, yi is the standardized score of the
indicator xi, using the standard deviation (SD) and mean of xi.
As we can see from Table 4, there is not really a very high correlation between efforts
with the states of ﬂexicurity. Furthermore, we see negative correlations between the efforts
and states of the ﬂexicurity concepts. For this reason, if both efforts and state variables are
included in the same index, we would not be able to interpret what is being measured
through this index. In addition, since the variables may cancel out each other (given that
there is a negative correlation) or at least do not correspond to one another, the result will
be misleading. It must be noted that the insigniﬁcance level of the correlations may be
related to the number of countries included in the analysis, which is a sample of the larger
number of countries in the whole of Europe. Thus, this analysis would beneﬁt from further
validation through a larger number of country samples. However, the analysis done here
serves to prove a point that, contrary to the assumptions made in previous ﬂexicurity
indicator literature, one must be careful in grouping ﬂexicurity efforts and states as one.
Lastly, the ﬂexicurity concepts are examined in combination to see whether the efforts
and states would correspond, focusing on the fact that ﬂexicurity emphasizes the
Table 4 Spearman correlation between Effort and States of ﬂexicurity per concept for selected European
countries
Concept State Correlation Signiﬁcance N
External ﬂexibility Average tenure -0.3 n.s. 19
Income security At-risk poverty -0.3 n.s. 18
Employment security Employment rate 0.5 n.s. 17
Unemployment rate -0.3 n.s. 17
Long-term unemployment rate -0.5 Sig (0.05) 17
Source Tables 1, 2, 3
n.s. not signiﬁcant
Signiﬁcance level at the 0.05 or higher
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123combination of ﬂexibility and security. For this exercise, two cluster analyses are done. In
the ﬁrst cluster analysis, ﬂexicurity efforts are used as input variables, to ﬁnd clusters of
ﬂexicurity efforts. In the second cluster analysis, ﬂexicurity state variables are used as the
input variables, to ﬁnd the cluster of ﬂexicurity states. We can then compare the two to ﬁnd
the similarities or differences found between the ﬂexicurity efforts and states. In the second
cluster analysis for the ﬂexicurity states, employment security state indicators are made
into one composite indicator, so that one variable is included for each of the concepts
measured here. The result is as Tables 5 and 6.
For ﬂexicurity efforts, four clusters are found. First cluster includes the Northern
European countries, Finland and Sweden, and the two most notable ﬂexicurity countries,
that is, Denmark and the Netherlands. These countries show above average efforts in
enhancing external numerical ﬂexibility, as well as strong efforts in enhancing both income
and employment security of their workers. The second group consists of Continental
European countries, that is, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France along with Norway.
These countries show rather below average efforts in enhancing external numerical ﬂex-
ibility, and about average efforts in enhancing employment security, while showing above
average efforts in providing income security. Third group is a rather mixed group, with
Germany, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. This group is about average in their employment
security efforts, and shows diversity in income security efforts as well as external
numerical ﬂexibility efforts. The last group, consisting of Greece, Italy, along with Poland
and United Kingdom, can be characterized as showing low efforts in enhancing both
income and employment security. On the other hand, this group shows rather diverse
ﬂexibility efforts, where UK and Poland show very high levels of external numerical
ﬂexibility efforts, Greece and Italy shows the lowest of all countries included.
The ﬂexicurity state cluster analysis outcomes result in three clusters. The ﬁrst cluster can
be distinguished by the high income security state and above average employment security
state. These countries include the northern European countries namely, Denmark, Finland,
the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, along with Austria, Czech Republic and Hungary. The
second group can be characterized as having low ﬂexibility state, low employment security
state, but average income security state. The countries included in this cluster are Belgium,
France, and Ireland. The last cluster has the lowest income security state, as well as a rather
low employment security state. On the other hand both this and the ﬁrst cluster of countries
show very diverse external numerical ﬂexibility states even within the cluster.
As we can see from the results, the clusters found from ﬂexicurity efforts and ﬂexicurity
states are not always corresponding. The number of clusters found is different for ﬂexi-
curity states and ﬂexicurity efforts and the country groupings do not match perfectly.
Table 5 Clusters of countries according to ﬂexicurity efforts
Countries External ﬂexibility
effort
Income security
effort
Employment security
effort
Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands,
Sweden
Medium to high High High to medium
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic,
France, Norway
Medium to low Medium to high Medium
Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain Medium to high Medium to high Medium
Greece, Italy, Poland, United Kingdom Low (GR/IT) to high
(PO/UK)
Low Low
Cluster analysis method: ward method, squared euclidian distance
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does not explain it completely. This may be a result of the fact that the countries that are in
bad ﬂexicurity states may be those who are putting more efforts into increasing their
ﬂexicurity statuses. However, examining this relationship in more detail, there is no clear
relationship found with ﬂexicurity state and effort where low states always lead to higher
efforts and vice versa. Regardless of the reason behind the discrepancy between ﬂexicurity
efforts and states, we can conclude that they do not correspond to one another. Thus it can
cause a problem when these two concepts are grouped into one composite indicator, based
on the presumption that they are highly correlated.
4 Discussion
In this paper I have elaborated on the various issues that should be taken into account when
doing ﬂexicurity analysis, as well as the framework, namely the stages and levels of
ﬂexicurity, that can be used to overcome some of these problems. Using the framework
proposed, some preliminary analysis is done to show how the framework can be used. The
country clusters provided here are by no means presented as the end of all ﬂexicurity
analyses. On the contrary, the analyses provide evidence to prove the point that it is very
important to review which ﬂexicurity indicators, at which levels and stages, are included in
the analyses as well as to review the methods used. The indicators and methods selected
will determine the country grouping or country scores on ﬂexicurity. This is due to the fact
that the stages of ﬂexicurity do not necessarily correspond to each other, nor do the levels,
as seen from the analysis outcomes of this paper. Thus, it is crucial to clarify which levels
and stages of ﬂexicurity are being addressed, and present the results according to the focus
one has taken, stating the limitations that come with it. This is a point seldom mentioned in
the current ﬂexicurity discussion, which results in an abundance of ﬂexicurity indicators
studies without any clear conclusions or agreements between the studies.
It should also be noted that this task of deriving ﬂexicurity indicators is a highly
politically sensitive one. This is especially true for the list of indicators that will be set up
by the European Commission. The CEC indicators will also be used to evaluate and access
the positions or the pathways the member states are in, as well as their policy outcomes,
and will be the basis for policy recommendations. Due to this reason, it will be crucial that
there is ﬁrst an agreement among the member states on what the deﬁnition and goals of
ﬂexicurity or measuring ﬂexicurity across countries are. The set of indicators for the EC
and member states would have to be simple enough for all member states and the social
Table 6 Clusters of countries according to ﬂexicurity states
Countries External
ﬂexibility
state
Income
security
state
Employment security state
Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
Hungary, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden
Mixed (high
to low)
High High to medium (with the
exception of Hungary: low)
Belgium, France, Ireland Low Medium Low (with the exception of
Ireland: medium)
Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
United Kingdom
Mixed (high
to low)
Low Low (with the exception of
UK: medium)
Cluster analysis method: ward method, squared euclidian distance
Measuring Flexicurity 169
123partners to understand and apply. Also, the set of indicators would have to be easily
measurable with data sets that are comparable across countries, most preferably using
reliable data sets, such as the ones from EUROSTAT. For scholars and policy makers, the
purposes of ﬂexicurity studies would not be very different. However, the set of indicators
in academic research can be more diverse to encompass the complexity of policies and
reality. One aspect that increases the complexity of ﬂexicurity measurement but requires
more attention is the distinction between various groups of population that need to be
examined separately. These are the vulnerable groups of society, for example, the low-
skilled, women, youth, older workers and migrant workers. Developing two sets of indi-
cators may be a good solution. One simpliﬁed set of indicators could be developed to
increase the ease of delivery and understanding by the member states and their actors.
Another more complex set of indicators could also be developed by and for scholars to
capture greater complexity.
In conclusion, it may be impossible to have one end all set of indicators of ﬂexicurity
that can be used for all circumstances, for policy makers as well as academics. This is due
to the fact that the measurements and indicators included depend heavily on the deﬁnition,
operationalisation, and the key research interest each person has with regards to ﬂexicurity.
Every person/group has different ideas and academic and political goals in setting forth
ﬂexicurity research, thus the result will vary accordingly. For a uniﬁed set of indicators for
ﬂexicurity to be agreed upon, there must ﬁrst be an agreement on the deﬁnition on what
ﬂexicurity actually is, and the purpose of why we need to measure ﬂexicurity and compare
it across countries. If not, the indicators derived will be meaningless and it will be hard to
convince others of its justiﬁcation.
The analyses done in this paper are also not without limitations. Most of the analyses
have been done with a sample of countries from the larger number of countries in Europe,
and some of the analysis outcomes may be inﬂuenced by the countries included. In
addition, our data comes from a speciﬁc time period, between 2005 and 2008, which may
also inﬂuence the analysis outcomes. Thus for further validation of the points mentioned,
repeated studies based on larger pool of countries and different years would be of help.
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